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The Supreme Court’s recent decision in McConnell v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission1 marks the culmination of an effort begun in 2000 to 
shift the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence in an important, 
though potentially dangerous, direction.  Under pre-2000 jurispru-
dence, the Court (with one notable exception)2 upheld campaign fi-
nance laws only when the government demonstrated, with a reason-
able amount of evidence, that the laws were closely drawn to prevent 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.  The new jurisprudence, 
while purporting to apply the same anticorruption standard, does so 
with a new and extensive deference to legislative judgments on both 
the need for campaign finance regulation and the proper means to 
achieve it. 
There are signs that this shift is not merely the slipping of existing 
standards.  Rather, it appears that the Court’s jurisprudence is moving 
in the direction proposed by Justice Breyer, toward upholding cam-
paign finance laws that promote a kind of political equality.  Justice 
Breyer termed the rationale a “general participatory self-government 
objective,”3 and explained its aim “to democratize the influence that 
money can bring to bear upon the electoral process, thereby building 
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1 540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003). 
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public confidence in that process, broadening the base of a candi-
date’s meaningful financial support, and encouraging greater public 
participation.”4
This apparent shift might be welcome news for those who believe 
that the Court was previously too restrictive of efforts to limit the role 
of money in politics in order to promote greater political equality.5  
But the means by which the Court has undertaken this shift have 
proven problematic.  The Court has continued to entertain the fiction 
that it is adhering to the anticorruption rationale of Buckley v. Valeo,6 
perhaps because one or two members of the five-Justice majority mak-
ing the shift in McConnell may be unwilling (at least now) to expressly 
embrace Justice Breyer’s participatory self-government rationale.7  In 
order to uphold bolder campaign finance laws purportedly under the 
Buckley standard, the Court has:  (1) reduced the evidentiary burden 
that the government must meet to show that a law is necessary to 
combat corruption or its appearance; (2) relaxed the level of scrutiny 
applicable to reviewing campaign finance regulation; and (3) espe-
cially in the McConnell case, engaged in unusually sloppy and incom-
plete reasoning to justify its holdings.  The result is jurisprudential in-
coherence and a lead opinion in the most important campaign 
4 Id. at 253. 
5 I have written in favor of the equality rationale in a number of places, including 
Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy:  An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of 
Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Hasen, Clipping Cou-
pons], and Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1999) [hereinafter Hasen, Rupert Murdoch Problem]. 
6 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
7 Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the 2000 case, Nixon v. 
Shrink Missouri Government PAC (Shrink Missouri), 528 U.S. 377, 399 (2000) (Breyer, J., 
concurring), setting forth the participatory self-government rationale.  Justice Stevens, 
joined by Justice Ginsburg, endorsed an equality rationale for campaign finance earlier 
in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC (Colorado I), 518 U.S. 604, 649 
(1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting), which has at least some overlap with the participatory 
self-government rationale.  Justice Souter has never explicitly endorsed the participa-
tory self-government rationale, though he wrote the majority opinions in three of the 
four cases shifting the Court’s jurisprudence in its direction.  See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 
U.S. 146 (2003) (Souter, J.); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado 
II), 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (Souter, J.); Shrink Missouri (Souter, J.); see also infra Part I.C 
(discussing these three cases).  This leaves Justice O’Connor, who before McConnell 
had written very few words in the many campaign finance cases she has considered 
since she joined the Court and has now shifted her position three times on the consti-
tutionality of limiting corporate election-related expenditures.  See DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN 
& RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 853, 952 (3d ed. 2004) 
(discussing Justice O’Connor’s position shift among FEC v. Massachusetts, Citizens for 
Life, Inc., Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, and McConnell). 
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finance case in a generation that appears to pay only cursory attention 
to the First Amendment interests that must be balanced in evaluating 
any campaign finance regime. 
Justice Breyer, in setting forth his participatory self-government 
rationale, has noted the Court’s important role both in balancing 
competing constitutional interests and in “evaluating the risk that re-
form legislation will defeat the very objective of participatory self-
government itself; for example, where laws would set limits so low that 
by elevating the reputation-related or media-related advantages of in-
cumbency to the point where they would insulate incumbents from 
effective challenge.”8  The Court, however, has failed to meaningfully 
balance or closely examine new campaign finance laws for self-
dealing.  Indeed, in McConnell, the Court in the joint majority opin-
ion9 appears to abdicate its role in this regard, hiding behind plati-
tudes about evidentiary burdens and levels of scrutiny in upholding 
various aspects of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA).10
Three examples demonstrate McConnell’s failure.  First, the joint 
majority opinion cannot persuasively explain under the Buckley anti-
corruption standard why it is permissible for Congress to regulate the 
fundraising and spending of local political parties and candidates ab-
sent any evidence that local political parties or candidates can serve as 
conduits for corruption of federal officials.  The majority’s attempt to 
distinguish the activities of political talk show hosts and newspaper 
editors as non-regulable only further muddles the analysis.  Second, 
the joint majority opinion fails to engage in a serious analysis of the 
potential overbreadth issues raised by regulating election-time adver-
tisements that may not in fact be intended to influence and may not 
even affect federal elections.  Thus, the majority never expressly con-
siders whether the statute, under Justice Breyer’s standard, “strike[s] a 
8 Breyer, supra note 3, at 254; see also Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 403-04 (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (“We should defer to [the legislature’s] political judgment that unlimited 
spending threatens the integrity of the electoral process.  But we should not defer in 
respect to whether its solution . . . significantly increases the reputation-related or me-
dia-related advantages of incumbency and thereby insulates legislators from effective 
electoral challenge.”) 
9 In speaking of the “joint majority opinion” in McConnell, I refer to the Court’s 
opinion discussing the constitutionality of Titles I and II of BCRA, jointly authored by 
Justices Stevens and O’Connor.  Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the opinion for the 
Court on BCRA Titles III and IV, and Justice Breyer authored the opinion for the 
Court on BCRA Title V. 
 10  Pub. L. No. 107-171, 101, 116 Stat. 81, 82 (codified at 2 U.S.C.A. § 441i(a) 
(Supp. 2003)). 
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reasonable balance between [its] electoral speech-restricting and 
speech-enhancing consequences.”11  Third, the joint majority opinion 
never even mentions, much less explains, how the rationale that 
would support regulating corporate-funded election-related spending 
could apply to union-funded election-related spending.12
The participatory self-government rationale may provide a persua-
sive reason for the Court to have upheld these provisions.  But the 
analysis is difficult and subtle.  Shoehorning it into a Buckley anticor-
ruption analysis has done everyone a disservice, giving short shrift to 
competing First Amendment values and threatening to undermine 
the very participatory self-government goals favored by at least some 
members of the McConnell majority. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I briefly surveys the pre-
McConnell campaign finance jurisprudence, contrasting Buckley and 
the pre-2000 cases on the one hand, with the Court’s three post-2000, 
pre-McConnell cases on the other.  The recent trend, even before 
McConnell, is inconsistent with the Buckley rationale, at least as Buckley 
has been traditionally understood.  The Court has replaced a general 
skepticism of campaign finance regulation with unprecedented defer-
ence to legislative determinations on both the need for regulation and 
the means best suited to achieve regulatory goals. 
Part II uses three examples from the McConnell joint majority 
opinion to demonstrate how the case fits into the new deferential 
post-2000 campaign finance jurisprudence. 
Part III points to signs apparent in the post-2000 jurisprudence, 
and intensified in McConnell, that the Court is moving toward endors-
ing the participatory self-government rationale for campaign finance 
regulation. 
Part IV argues that that if indeed the Court is moving toward en-
dorsement of the participatory self-government rationale, it should do 
so more carefully.  Thus far, the Court has given only lip service to the 
requirement that it balance competing interests and police campaign 
finance measures for legislative self-dealing.  Had the Court engaged 
in such balancing and policing in McConnell, it might have articulated 
11 Breyer, supra note 3, at 253. 
12 The majority opinion is muddled on the issue of disclosure as well, a point I 
tackle in Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Easy Case for Disclosure of Contributions and 
Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 3 ELECTION L.J. 251 (2004).  See also Elizabeth 
Garrett, McConnell v. FEC and Disclosure, 3 ELECTION L.J. 237, 238 (2004) (arguing 
“that McConnell v. FEC will protect most disclosure statutes from First Amendment chal-
lenges and allow reformers to adopt even more sweeping requirements”). 
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a more coherent and subtle explanation for upholding—or perhaps 
even struck down some of—the major provisions of BCRA.  At the very 
least, had the Court engaged in more careful analysis it would not 
have been faulted for giving First Amendment concerns short shrift.  
Part IV concludes by examining the danger that the Court eventually 
will eviscerate the distinction between contributions and expenditures 
without taking into account a key requirement of the participatory 
self-government rationale:  the need for vibrant election-related par-
ticipation by a large group of non-governmental actors.  In particular, 
Part IV concludes that the Court should be wary of approving any ad-
ditional expenditure limits that are not coupled with a leveling-up 
mechanism, such as a broad public financing program. 
Depending upon the next appointments to the Supreme Court, 
the campaign finance jurisprudential shift, currently hanging by a 
one-vote majority, could be short-lived or long-lived.  At least for the 
near term, and perhaps for much longer, it will be important to bring 
some coherence to the Court’s analysis in this area.  This Article is a 
modest effort in this regard. 
I.  BEFORE MCCONNELL:  THE SLOW DEATH OF BUCKLEY 
A.  From Buckley into the 1980s:  Court Skepticism of Campaign Finance 
Regulation 
If, as it appears, McConnell was a compromise decision drafted to 
take into account the competing and sometimes contradictory views of 
the members of its majority, it is in good company.  Buckley itself was 
drafted by committee, and some of its internal inconsistencies may 
best be explained by tensions in reasoning among the authors of its 
various parts.13
The majority and dissenting opinions in McConnell devote many 
pages to debating the joint majority opinion’s fidelity—or lack 
13 See Richard L. Hasen, The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo, 2 ELECTION 
L.J. 241 (2003) (relating a chronology of the Court’s internal deliberations concerning 
Buckley, from the post-argument conference to the issuance of the decision).  The 
muddled reasoning in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), 
may also be explained as the result of political compromise.  See RICHARD L. HASEN, 
THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW:  JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO 
BUSH V. GORE 113-14 (2003) [hereinafter HASEN, SUPREME COURT & ELECTION LAW] 
(tracing Austin’s drafting history). 
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thereof—to Buckley;14 legal commentators have also begun tackling 
this issue.15  Therefore, this Part gives only a brief description in-
tended to show the shift from past to present16 and to orient readers 
unfamiliar with the campaign finance landscape to the important 
precedents discussed throughout the rest of this Article.  Readers al-
ready familiar with the major campaign finance decisions may wish to 
skip to Part II. 
The Supreme Court’s 1976 Buckley case considered the constitu-
tionality of much of the 1974 Amendments to the Federal Election 
14 Compare McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 655-58 (joint majority opinion) (describing how 
the standards set forth in Buckley apply to the McConnell decision), with 124 S. Ct. at 
744-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the ma-
jority improperly extends the reasoning of Buckley). 
15 See, e.g., Robert F. Bauer, McConnell, Parties, and the Decline of the Right of Associa-
tion, 3 ELECTION L.J. 199, 204 (2004) (arguing that the notion of deference in McCon-
nell is a departure from Buckley, but that both cases take a similarly narrow view of the 
right of association); Robert F. Bauer, When “the Pols Make the Calls”:  McConnell’s The-
ory of Judicial Deference in the Twilight of Buckley, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 5, 17 (2004) (examin-
ing the relationship between the reasoning of Buckley and the notion of deference in 
McConnell); Lillian R. BeVier, McConnell v. FEC:  Not Senator Buckley’s First Amendment, 
3 ELECTION L.J. 127, 128 (2004) (arguing that McConnell discarded Buckley’s underlying 
premises and almost entirely dismantled the limits that Buckley imposed on the power 
of legislatures to regulate speech during political campaigns); Richard Briffault, 
McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Finance Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147 
(2004) (arguing that McConnell was, in different respects, both an extension of and a 
departure from Buckley); Samuel Issacharoff, Throwing in the Towel:  The Constitutional 
Morass of Campaign Finance, 3 ELECTION L.J. 259, 261 (2004) (“[T]here can be little 
doubt, after Buckley, that there must be a significant rights overlay to the expressive 
dimension of campaign finance regulation. . . . A striking feature of McConnell is the 
almost complete absence of such conventional First Amendment concerns.”); Daniel 
H. Lowenstein, BCRA and McConnell in Perspective, 3 ELECTION L.J. 277, 282 (2004) 
(“Buckley is not only not dead, it may not be dying at all.”); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Unbear-
able Lightness of Being McConnell, 3 ELECTION L.J. 299, 301 (2004) (arguing that 
McConnell embraced Buckley’s rules while implicitly rejecting its rationale); Spencer 
Overton, Judicial Modesty and the Lessons of McConnell v. FEC, 3 ELECTION L.J. 305, 305-
09, 314 (2004) (arguing that McConnell was faithful to Buckley, and that McConnell was 
an example of the Court “remaining true to its past opinions”); Roy A. Schotland, Act I:  
BCRA Wins in Congress.  Act II:  BCRA Wins Big at the Court.  Act III:  BCRA Loses to Reality, 
3 ELECTION L.J. 335, 336 (2004) (arguing that McConnell was a departure from Buckley); 
Bradley A. Smith, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission: Ideology Trumps Reality, 
Pragmatism, 3 ELECTION L.J. 345, 346-47 (2004) (“[BCRA] restores neither the system 
passed by Congress in 1974 nor that system as trimmed back by Buckley”); Ellen L. 
Weintraub, Perspectives on Corruption, 3 ELECTION L.J. 355, 359-60 (2004) (arguing that 
McConnell was a departure from Buckley). 
16 Some of the descriptions of the pre-McConnell case law below appear in slightly 
different form in HASEN, SUPREME COURT & ELECTION LAW, supra note 13, at 105-14.  
For a fuller description of the campaign finance jurisprudence, see LOWENSTEIN & 
HASEN, supra note 7, at 717-1024. 
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Campaign Act (FECA).17  The FECA Amendments were complex; they 
provided for, among other things:  (1) limits on the amounts that in-
dividuals or organizations could contribute to candidates (“contribu-
tion limits”);18 (2) limits on the amounts that individuals or organiza-
tions could spend, independently of candidates, to support or oppose 
candidates for federal office (“expenditure limits”);19 (3) public fi-
nancing for major presidential candidates;20 and (4) the creation of 
the Federal Election Commission.21  The Court upheld FECA’s contri-
bution limits, struck down the expenditure limits, upheld the public 
financing system, and struck down the means for the appointment of 
members of the FEC.22
Most notable for our purposes is the Court’s decision to uphold 
the campaign contribution limits but to strike down the expenditure 
limits.  Although recognizing that any law regulating campaign financ-
ing was subject to the “exacting scrutiny required by the First 
Amendment,”23 the Court mandated divergent treatment of contribu-
tions and expenditures for two reasons.  First, the Court held that 
campaign expenditures were core political speech, but a limit on the 
amount of campaign contributions only marginally restricted a con-
tributor’s ability to send a message of support for a candidate.24  Thus, 
expenditures were entitled to greater constitutional protection than 
contributions.  Second, the Buckley Court recognized only the interests 
in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption as justify-
ing infringement on First Amendment rights.25
The Court held that large contributions raise the problem of cor-
ruption “[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to secure a 
 17   Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codi-
fied as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (2002)).  The 1974 Amendments amended the 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
18 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13 n.12 (citing relevant statutory provisions). 
19 See id. at 13 nn.13-15 (citing relevant statutory provision).  FECA now treats 
spending in coordination with candidates as a contribution, not as an expenditure.  See 
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (“For purposes of this subsection . . . expenditures made 
by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or sug-
gestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be 
considered to be a contribution to such candidate.”). 
20 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85-86 n.114 (summarizing the relevant provisions). 
21 See id. at 109 (summarizing the relevant provisions). 
22 Id. at 143. 
23 Id. at 16 (citations omitted). 
24 Id. at 21. 
25 Id. at 26, 45-48. 
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political quid pro quo from current and potential officeholders.”26  
But truly independent expenditures do not raise the same danger of 
corruption, because a quid pro quo is less attainable if politician and 
spender cannot communicate about the expenditure.27
With the corruption interest having failed to justify a limit upon 
independent expenditures, the Court considered the alternative ar-
gument that expenditure limits were justified by “the ancillary gov-
ernmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and 
groups to influence the outcome of elections.” 28  In one of the most 
famous (some would say notorious) sentences in Buckley, the Court re-
jected this equality rationale for campaign finance regulation, at least 
in the context of expenditure limits:  “[T]he concept that government 
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to 
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment.”29
Portions of Buckley certainly show some deference to legislative 
judgments.  For example, the Court refused to consider whether the 
amount of the individual contribution limits (set at $1000, which is 
equal to just under $3300 in 2004 dollars30) was too low.31  The 
amount of contribution limitations would raise constitutional prob-
lems only when it prevented candidates and committees from “amass-
ing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.” 32  But the overall 
tenor and tone of Buckley was one of skepticism of legislative judg-
ments about the need for campaign finance regulation. 
26 Id. at 26. 
27 Id. at 46-47. 
28 Id. at 48. 
29 Id. at 48-49.  Seven of the eight Justices deciding the case concurred in this 
statement (Justice Stevens, new to the Court, did not participate), though the drafting 
history reveals that at least two more of the Justices were ambivalent about the equality 
rationale. See HASEN, SUPREME COURT & ELECTION LAW, supra note 13, at 106-07 (not-
ing that during the drafting process, Justices White, Marshall, and Brennan all ex-
pressed a willingness to defer to Congress). 
30 Calculated using the “inflation calculator” at the website of the U.S. Department 
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics:  http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last vis-
ited September 15, 2004). 
31 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30.  The Court also upheld an aggregate annual $25,000 in-
dividual contribution limit to federal candidates, parties, and political committees.  Id. 
at 38; see also Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (CMA)(upholding a $5000 
limit on annual contributions by individuals and unincorporated associations to multi-
candidate political committees supporting federal candidates).  For a further discus-
sion of this aspect of Buckley and CMA, see infra Part IV.C. 
32 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. 
 
2004] BUCKLEY IS DEAD, LONG LIVE BUCKLEY 39 
 
Thus, the Court rejected expenditure limits not only because they 
interfered with free speech and association rights but also because—
given the Court’s narrowing interpretation of FECA’s reach only to 
cover advertisements containing express words of advocacy (such as 
“Vote for Smith”)33—the limits could be circumvented easily, meaning 
that such limits would serve “no substantial societal interest.” 34  In-
deed, the Court applied its narrowing construction to FECA’s disclo-
sure rules,35 leaving many election-related campaign expenditures 
lacking any regulation whatsoever. 
While we may debate in hindsight whether Buckley struck more of 
a tone of deference or skepticism, there is little doubt that the imme-
diate post-Buckley Supreme Court jurisprudence came down firmly on 
the side of skepticism.  In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,36 the 
Court rejected a Massachusetts law aimed at limiting the participation 
of corporations in ballot measure campaigns.  Defending the law, the 
state argued that corporate participation in the referendum process 
would exert undue influence on the outcome of the vote “and—in the 
end—destroy the confidence of the people in the democratic process 
and the integrity of government.  According to [the state], corpora-
tions are wealthy and powerful and their views may drown out other 
points of view.” 37  Noting that “the proper question . . . is not whether 
corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights . . . [but whether the Mas-
sachusetts law] abridges expression that the First Amendment was 
meant to protect,” 38 the Court held that “the fact that advocacy may 
persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it.” 39
Similarly, in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley (CARC),40 
the Court rejected a city ordinance limiting contributions to ballot 
measure committees to $250.  The California Supreme Court had up-
held the measure as a means of preserving “voters’ confidence” in the 
ballot measure process, but the United States Supreme Court, in re-
jecting the ordinance, flatly stated that “the record in this case [did] 
33 See id. at 44 n.52 (restricting the application of 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) “to com-
munications containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote 
for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘de-
feat,’ ‘reject.’”). 
34 Id. at 45. 
35 Id. at 67. 
36 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
37 Id. at 789. 
38 Id. at 776. 
39 Id. at 790. 
40 454 U.S. 290 (1981). 
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not support” the lower court’s conclusion that the ordinance was nec-
essary to preserve such voter confidence.41  The Court did not explain 
what evidence would be sufficient to make such a showing. 
And in FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee 
(NCPAC),42 the Court rejected a portion of the Presidential Election 
Campaign Fund Act that prevented independent spending over $1000 
to further the election of a presidential candidate who had opted-in to 
the public financing system.  In holding that the law could not be jus-
tified on anticorruption grounds, the Court defined corruption as fol-
lows: 
 Corruption is a subversion of the political process.  Elected officials 
are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the pros-
pect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their 
campaigns.  The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo:  
dollars for political favors.
43
Without elaboration, the majority stated that it would defer to the 
lower court’s finding that the evidence of corruption or its appear-
ance supporting the challenged law was “evanescent.”44
The one exception to the Court’s skepticism in the 1980s to cam-
paign finance regulation was for limits on corporate involvement in 
the political process.  Thus, in FEC v. National Right to Work Committee 
(NRWC),45 the Court upheld a federal law that prohibited corpora-
tions without shareholders from soliciting anyone but their “mem-
bers” for their separate political committees.  It accepted the govern-
ment’s rationale that the law “ensure[d] that substantial aggregations 
of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the corpo-
rate form of organization should not be converted into political ‘war 
chests’ which could be used to incur political debts from legislators 
who are aided by the contributions.”46  And it held that this rationale 
could apply even to an ideological organization that had adopted the 
corporate form.47
But even the Court’s special solicitude for campaign finance laws 
regulating corporations was limited:  in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for 
41 Id. at 299 (citing Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 614 P.2d 742 
(Cal. 1980). 
42 470 U.S. 480 (1985). 
43 Id. at 497. 
44 Id. at 499. 
45 459 U.S. 197 (1982). 
46 Id. at 207. 
47 Id. at 205. 
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Life, Inc. (MCFL), the Court held that it violated the First Amendment 
to apply the FECA provision requiring corporations to fund express 
advocacy for or against federal candidates only out of separate funds 
to an ideological corporation that did not engage in business activi-
ties, had no shareholders, and was neither established nor would take 
contributions from a business corporation or labor union.48
B.  The Austin Interlude 
Recall that the Court in NRWC justified its law based upon the 
“substantial aggregations of wealth” accomplished with the corporate 
form that could be used to build “war chests” and incur “political 
debts,”49  a classic anticorruption rationale.  In MCFL, the Court in dicta 
transformed that NRWC anticorruption language into what I have 
termed a “barometer equality” argument,50 suggesting that corporate 
spending might be limited because “[r]elative availability of funds is 
after all a rough barometer of public support.”51
In 1990, the dictum became a holding in Austin v. Michigan Cham-
ber of Commerce.52  At issue was a Michigan law that barred corporations, 
other than media corporations, from using general treasury funds for 
independent expenditures in state election campaigns.  Under the 
reasoning of Buckley, the law regulating independent expenditures 
should have been struck down, at least absent proof that corporate 
independent expenditures in fact allowed for quid pro quo corrup-
tion.  Instead, the Court accepted the barometer equality rationale for 
the regulation (at least as applied to corporations), while using the in-
correct label of corruption: 
Regardless of whether [the] danger of “financial quid pro quo” corruption 
may be sufficient to justify a restriction on independent expenditures, 
Michigan’s regulation aims at a different type of corruption in the politi-
cal arena:  the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations 
of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and 
that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corpora-
tion’s political ideas.
53
48 479 U.S. 238, 263-64 (1986). 
49 459 U.S. at 207. 
50 HASEN, SUPREME COURT & ELECTION LAW, supra note 13, at 110. 
51 MCFL, 479 U.S. 197, 258 (1982). 
52 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
53 Id. at 659-60 (citations omitted). 
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Austin marked the first and only time to that point that the Court 
had upheld an expenditure limitation, and, as the 1990s progressed, it 
was unclear whether Austin retained any vitality.54  The 1996 case, Colo-
rado I, produced no majority opinion and a plurality opinion from Jus-
tices Breyer, O’Connor and Souter that tried to decide as little as pos-
sible.  The dramatic shift began in 2000, when it appears that Justices 
Breyer and Souter got their sea legs on the campaign finance issue. 
C.  The Shift in the 2000s:  The Deferential Model of Campaign Finance 
Jurisprudence 
It is wrong to view McConnell as an isolated earthquake in cam-
paign finance jurisprudence.  Rather, it is best seen as the latest in a 
series of significant tremors commencing in 2000 in Nixon v. Shrink 
Missouri Government PAC,55 and continuing in 2001’s Colorado II56 and 
2003’s FEC v. Beaumont.57  Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion in 
all three cases. 
In upholding the constitutionality of Missouri’s low campaign 
contribution limits for state offices, the Court majority in Shrink Mis-
souri did four things of jurisprudential significance.58  First, the Court 
ratcheted down the level of scrutiny from Buckley’s “exacting” level of 
54 See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosaic:  Campaign Finance and the 
First Amendment After Austin, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 381, 383 (1992) (suggesting that Austin 
might be an “aberration”). 
55 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
56 533 U.S. 431 (2001). 
57 539 U.S. 146 (2003).  Writing after Beaumont but before McConnell, Brad Smith 
already saw the trend developing. See Bradley A. Smith, Campaign Finance Reform:  
Searching for Corruption in All the Wrong Places, 2002-2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 187, 222 
(“Beaumont on its own is not particularly significant, but combined with other recent 
cases, most notably Shrink PAC and Colorado Republican II, it is significant indeed.”); see 
also Fredric D. Woocher, Beaumont v. Federal Election Commission:  A Pre-Cursor of 
More Important Things to Come?, 2 ELECTION L.J. 255, 260-61 (2003) (“[T]hose inter-
ested in the fate of the BCRA would be well-advised to pay heed to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Beaumont.”). 
58 I provide greater detail on these claims in Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri, 
Campaign Finance, and “The Thing that Wouldn’t Leave,” 17 CONST. COMMENT. 483, 490-
97 (2000). 
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scrutiny59 to one in which interests need only be “sufficiently impor-
tant”60 and not narrowly tailored to the government’s interest.61
Second the Court sufficiently expanded the definitions of “cor-
ruption” and “the appearance of corruption” to justify campaign fi-
nance regulation.  The Court explained that “corruption” extended 
beyond quid pro quo arrangements to embrace “the broader threat 
from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.” 62  
As for “the appearance of corruption,” the Court remarked, “[l]eave 
the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the cynical assump-
tion that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of 
voters to take part in democratic governance.”63
Third, and perhaps most significantly, the Court lowered the evi-
dentiary burden for proving corruption or its appearance.  The Court 
began by noting that “[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to 
satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up 
or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.” 64  
Although the Court insisted that “mere conjecture” 65 was not enough 
to support a campaign limit, it held that Missouri could justify the 
need for its contribution limits to fight corruption or the appearance 
of corruption by relying on some pretty flimsy evidence:  an affidavit 
from a Missouri legislator who had supported the legislation stating 
that large contributions have “‘the real potential to buy votes’”;66 
newspaper accounts suggesting possible corruption in Missouri poli-
tics;67 and the passage of an earlier Missouri voter initiative establish-
ing campaign contribution limits.68
Fourth, the Court created a difficult test for challenging the con-
stitutionality of a contribution limit as too low to prevent effective ad-
vocacy.  Refining (or changing) the effective advocacy test from Buck-
59 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (per curiam) (“[T]his Court has 
never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of 
money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting 
scrutiny required by the First Amendment.”). 
60 Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 388 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
61 See id. (“[T]he dollar amount of the limit need not be ‘fine tun[ed].’” (altera-
tion in original, citation omitted)). 
62 Id. at 389. 
63 Id. at 390. 
64 Id. at 391. 
65 Id. at 392. 
66 Id. at 393 (quoting an affidavit from State Senator Wayne Goode). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 394. 
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ley, the Court stated:  “[w]e asked, in other words, whether the contri-
bution limitation was so radical in effect as to render political associa-
tion ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate’s voice below the level 
of notice, and render contributions pointless.”69  In an era of faxes, 
web pages, and e-mails, it is hard to imagine any contribution limit 
that would fail the test of constitutionality. 
Shrink Missouri was also the case where Justice Breyer, in a concur-
ring opinion, fired his opening salvo for the participatory self-
government rationale.  Remarking that Buckley’s statement rejecting 
the equality rationale as being wholly foreign to the First Amendment 
“cannot be taken literally,” 70 Justice Breyer posited that “constitution-
ally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal equation.” 71  He 
explained: 
 On the one hand, a decision to contribute money to a campaign is a 
matter of First Amendment concern—not because money is speech (it is 
not); but because it enables speech. . . .  
 On the other hand, restrictions upon the amount any one individual 
can contribute to a particular candidate seek to protect the integrity of 
the electoral process—the means through which a free society democ-
ratically translates political speech into concrete governmental action.  
Moreover, by limiting the size of the largest contributions, such restric-
tions aim to democratize the influence that money itself may bring to 
bear upon the electoral process.  In doing so, they seek to build public 
confidence in that process and broaden the base of a candidate’s mean-
ingful financial support, encouraging the public participation and open 
discussion that the First Amendment itself presupposes.
72
Justice Breyer then called for deference to the legislature’s under-
standing of “the threat to electoral integrity [and] the need for de-
mocratization,” 73 though not for deference with respect to whether a 
contribution limit “significantly increases the reputation-related or 
media-related advantages of incumbency . . . .” 74
Colorado II continued the trend toward relaxing Buckley’s rules.  
The question there was whether political parties had a constitutional 
69 Id. at 397. 
70 Id. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
71 Id. at 400. 
72 Id. at 400-01 (citations omitted). 
73 Id. at 403. 
74 Id. at 404.  On this point, Justice Breyer wrote that the statutory limit was “low 
enough to raise such a question.  But given the empirical information presented . . . I 
agree with the Court that the statute does not work disproportionate harm.”  Id. 
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right to spend unlimited sums in coordination with the parties’ can-
didates.  FECA treats a coordinated expenditure as a contribution, 
and limits the amount of coordinated expenditures that a party may 
make with a party’s candidate.75  By a 5-4 vote, the Court upheld the 
FECA provision, primarily on grounds that parties may serve as con-
duits for corruption:  “[W]hether they like it or not, [parties] act as 
agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to produce obligated 
officeholders.”76  In support of this conclusion, the Court once again 
relied upon some rather casual empirical evidence.77
One question left open after MCFL was whether it was permissible 
for the government to limit campaign contributions by corporations en-
titled to an MCFL exemption from the ban on direct corporate ex-
penditures.  In FEC v. Beaumont,78 the Supreme Court held it was per-
missible to ban such contributions. 
Beaumont is significant in two respects.  First, the Court called into 
question Bellotti’s statement that the corporate form of the speaker is 
irrelevant for purposes of determining the degree of First Amend-
ment protection.  Thus, the Beaumont Court declared: 
Within the realm of contributions generally, corporate contributions are 
furthest from the core of political expression, since corporations’ First 
Amendment speech and association interests are derived largely from 
those of their members, and of the public in receiving information.  A 
ban on direct corporate contributions leaves individual members of cor-
porations free to make their own contributions, and deprives the public 
of little or no material information.
79
Following Beaumont, it became an open question whether a ban 
on corporate expenditures, even in the context of ballot measure cam-
75 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (“For purposes of this subsection . . . expendi-
tures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the re-
quest or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their 
agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate.”); 2 U.S.C. § 
441a(d)(3) (“The national committee of a political party, or a State committee of a 
political party, including any subordinate committee of a State committee, may not 
make any expenditure in connection with the general election campaign of a candi-
date for Federal office in a State who is affiliated with such party which exceeds [speci-
fied limits].”) 
76 Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 452. 
77 See Richard L. Hasen, The Constitutionality of a Soft Money Ban After Colorado Re-
publican II, 1 ELECTION L.J. 195, 203 (2002) (explaining that the Court did its own re-
search by “web-surfing to the FEC’s website to look at the pattern of PAC giving to 
candidates”). 
78 539 U.S. 146 (2003). 
79 Id. at 161 n.8 (citations omitted). 
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paigns, might also be said to “‘leave individual members of corpora-
tions free to make their own . . . [expenditures] and deprive[] the 
public of little or no material information.’” 80
Second, Beaumont suggested that Austin remained good law, 
though without quoting Austin’s most controversial language endors-
ing the barometer equality rationale.81  The Beaumont Court further 
bolstered its analysis by applying Colorado II’s anticircumvention ra-
tionale to the case of corporate contributions,82 and noting that judi-
cial deference was particularly appropriate “where, as here, we deal 
with a congressional judgment that has remained essentially un-
changed throughout a century of ‘careful legislative adjustment.’”83
What remained of Buckley after the three post-2000 decisions was 
principally its rule against campaign expenditure limits outside the 
context of corporate (and perhaps union) expenditures.  McConnell 
built upon the other three post-2000 decisions and, as the next two 
Parts show, it calls into question even the contribution-expenditure 
dichotomy.  Buckley appears to be dying a slow death beneath the rub-
ble created by recent seismic events. 
II.  MCCONNELL V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION:  FIDELITY TO THE NEW 
POST-2000 JURISPRUDENCE 
A.  The Basic Soft Money and Issue Advocacy Holdings of McConnell 
Although the Court decided challenges to over twenty provisions 
of BCRA, I focus here on the Court’s decision to uphold BCRA’s vari-
ous soft money provisions,84 as well as the Court’s decision upholding 
80 LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 7, at 855 (quoting Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161 
n.8). 
81 See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 153-54 (citing Austin for its anticorruption rationale). 
82 See id. at 155 (“[R]estricting contributions by various organizations hedges 
against their use as conduits for ‘circumvention of [valid] contribution limits.’”) (quot-
ing Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 456 n.18 (alteration in original)). 
83 Id. at 162 n.9 (quoting NRWC, 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982)). 
84 The joint majority opinion in McConnell gave this history of the rise of soft 
money: 
[P]rior to the enactment of BCRA, federal law permitted corporations and 
unions, as well as individuals who had already made the maximum permissible 
contributions to federal candidates, to contribute “nonfederal money”—also 
known as “soft money”—to political parties for activities intended to influence 
state or local elections. 
 Shortly after Buckley was decided, questions arose concerning the treatment 
of contributions intended to influence both federal and state elections.  Al-
though a literal reading of FECA’s definition of “contribution” would have re-
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a BCRA provision preventing corporations and labor unions from 
spending funds on “electioneering communications” except through 
a segregated fund.  The joint majority opinion of Justices Stevens and 
O’Connor addressed the constitutionality of these provisions. 
The Court upheld all of the soft money provisions of BCRA.  
Thus, the Court held that it was permissible for Congress to (1) pro-
hibit national party committees and their agents from soliciting, re-
ceiving, or spending any soft money (§ 323(a));85 (2) prevent donors 
from contributing nonfederal funds to state and local party commit-
tees to help finance “federal election activity” (§ 323(b));86 (3) pro-
hibit national, state, and local party committees, and their agents or 
subsidiaries, from soliciting any funds for, or making or directing any 
donations to, certain tax-exempt organizations that make expendi-
tures in connection with elections for federal office (§ 323(d));87 (4) 
prohibit federal candidates and officeholders from soliciting, receiv-
ing, directing, transferring or spending soft money in connection with 
federal elections, and limiting the ability of federal candidates and of-
ficeholders to solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend soft money in 
connection with state and local elections (§ 323(e));88 and (5) pro-
quired such activities to be funded with hard money, the FEC ruled that po-
litical parties could fund mixed-purpose activities—including get-out-the-vote 
drives and generic party advertising—in part with soft money.  In 1995 the 
FEC concluded that the parties could also use soft money to defray the costs 
of “legislative advocacy media advertisements,” even if the ads mentioned the 
name of a federal candidate, so long as they did not expressly advocate the 
candidate’s election or defeat. 
124 S. Ct. at 648-49. 
85 See id. at 659-70 (upholding 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a) (new FECA § 323(a)). 
86 See id. at 670-77 (upholding 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(1) (new FECA § 323(b)).  BCRA 
defined “federal election activity” to include (1) voter registration efforts during the 
120 days before a regularly scheduled federal election; (2) voter identification, get-out-
the-vote and generic campaign activity that is “conducted in connection with an elec-
tion in which a candidate for Federal office appears on the ballot;” (3) any “public 
communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and 
“promotes,” “supports,” “attacks,” or “opposes” “a candidate for that office;” and (4) 
the services provided by a state committee employee who devotes more than 25 per-
cent of his or her time to activities in connection with a federal election.  2 U.S.C. §§ 
431(20)(A)(i)-(iv).  The provision provided an exception, the “Levin Amendment,” 
allowing state and local parties to pay for some of this activity partly with contributions 
limited to $10,000 per person.  Such funds could not be used to pay for any activities 
that refer to a clearly identified candidate for federal office and they could not be used 
to fund broadcast communications unless they referred solely to a clearly identified 
candidate for state or local office.  2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). 
87 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 678-82 (upholding 2 U.S.C. § 441i(d) (new FECA § 
323(d)). 
88 Id. at 682-83 (upholding 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e) (new FECA § 323(e)). 
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hibit state or local officeholders and candidates from spending soft 
money to fund communications that refer to a clearly identified can-
didate for federal office and that promote, support, attack or oppose a 
candidate for that office (§ 323(f)).89
As for issue advocacy, the Court upheld Congress’s extension of 
the existing requirement—that corporations and labor unions use 
separate funds for express advocacy—to the funding of broadcast 
communications that refer to clearly identified candidates for federal 
office, made within sixty days of a general election or thirty days of a 
primary, and targeted at the relevant electorate where the candidate is 
running for office (§ 203).90
No doubt, some of these provisions could have been upheld as a 
straightforward application of Buckley.  For example, even Justice 
Kennedy, who dissented from virtually all of the joint majority opin-
ion, voted to uphold § 323(e), the ban on solicitation of soft money by 
federal officeholders and candidates:  “The making of a solicited gift 
is a quid both to the recipient of the money and to the one who solicits 
the payment (by granting his request).”91  But a number of these pro-
visions required the Court to go well beyond Buckley. 
B.  Fidelity to Buckley or Fidelity to Shrink Missouri? 
Here, I offer three examples to demonstrate that the joint major-
ity opinion in McConnell fits much more comfortably with the three 
other post-2000 campaign finance decisions than with Buckley. 
1.  Regulating Activities of Local Political Parties and Candidates 
The joint majority opinion cited some pretty compelling evidence 
that the national political parties had become conduits for the sale of 
access to federal candidates and officeholders.  Assuming for now that 
89 Id. at 683-84 (upholding 2 U.S.C. § 441i(f)(1) (new FECA § 323(f)).  The law 
provided some exemptions when the federal officeholder was running for state or lo-
cal office.  2 U.S.C. § 441(f)(2). 
90 See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 694-98 (upholding 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)); 2 U.S.C. 
§ 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (new BCRA § 201) (defining “electioneering communication”).  The 
Court, by an 8-1 vote, also upheld the disclosure rules using the new definition of elec-
tioneering communications.  McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 689-94; see Hasen, supra note 12 
(discussing McConnell’s disclosure analysis). 
91 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 754 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
joined Justice Kennedy on this point. 
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the sale of access constitutes corruption,92 or at least creates the ap-
pearance of corruption, the Court appeared on solid ground under 
Buckley in upholding the national party soft money ban.93  The Court 
also cited some evidence of a danger that state political parties could 
become new conduits for the sale of access to federal officeholders.94
But there was no evidence of the potential for the sale of access 
through local political parties and plenty of evidence that BCRA’s soft 
money restrictions could interfere with the purely local election-
related activities.  In upholding the constitutionality of BCRA section 
323(b), the joint majority opinion cited to the deposition of a single 
former senator, stating that “much of what state and local parties do 
helps to elect federal candidates,”95 as well as to other depositions 
showing that national party officials had directed maxed-out national 
party donors to the state parties: 
[I]n addressing the problem of soft-money contributions to state com-
mittees, Congress both drew a conclusion and made a prediction.  Its 
conclusion, based on the evidence before it, was that the corrupting in-
fluence of soft money does not insinuate itself into the political process 
solely through national party committees.  Rather, state committees 
function as an alternate avenue for precisely the same corrupting forces.  
Indeed, both candidates and parties already ask donors who have 
reached the limit on their direct contributions to donate to state com-
mittees.  There is at least as much evidence as there was in Buckley that 
such donations have been made with the intent—and in at least some 
cases the effect—of gaining influence over federal officeholders.  Sec-
tion 323(b) thus promotes an important governmental interest by con-
fronting the corrupting influence that soft-money donations to political 
parties already have. 
 Congress also made a prediction.  Having been taught the hard les-
son of circumvention by the entire history of campaign finance regula-
tion, Congress knew that soft-money donors would react to § 323(a) by 
scrambling to find another way to purchase influence.  It was “neither 
novel nor implausible” for Congress to conclude that political commit-
tees would react to § 323(a) by directing soft-money contributors to the 
state committees, and that federal candidates would be just as indebted 
to these contributors as they had been to those who had formerly con-
92 But see McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 750 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)  (“As a conceptual 
matter, generic party contributions may engender good will from a candidate or of-
ficeholder . . . . Still, no Member of Congress testified this favoritism changed voting 
behavior.”).  I return to the issue of access as corruption in Part IV, infra. 
93 See id. at 659-70 (discussing the constitutionality of new FECA § 323(a)). 
94 Id. at 672-73. 
95 Id. at 672 n.59 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 467 (D.D.C. 
2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting former Senator Rudman)). 
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tributed to the national parties.  We “must accord substantial deference 
to the predictive judgments of Congress,” particularly when, as here, 
those predictions are so firmly rooted in relevant history and common 
sense.  Preventing corrupting activity from shifting wholesale to state 
committees and thereby eviscerating FECA clearly qualifies as an impor-
tant governmental interest.
96
Note the absence of evidence that local parties had been used in 
the past to circumvent federal contribution limits or to gain access to 
federal officeholders.  As the Chief Justice remarked in dissent:  “I am 
unaware of any evidence in the record that indicates that local politi-
cal parties have any relationship with federal candidates.”97  The local 
party ban therefore depended not on any evidence of corruption (or 
even the sale of access) but on a supposition that local parties have the 
potential to corrupt federal officeholders through the sale of access 
based on the benefits they may provide to federal candidates.98
The Court held that: 
[The] argument, that soft-money contributions to state and local candi-
dates for “public communications” do not corrupt or appear to corrupt 
federal candidates, ignores both the record in this litigation and Con-
gress’ strong interest in preventing circumvention of otherwise valid con-
tribution limits. . . . We will not upset Congress’ eminently reasonable 
prediction that, with these other avenues no longer available, state and 
local candidates and officeholders will become the next conduits for the 
soft-money funding of sham issue advertising.
99
Potential benefits turn out to be the key to the joint majority opin-
ion’s upholding of a number of BCRA’s more controversial provisions.  
Thus, the Court upheld BCRA section 323(f)’s requirement that state 
96 Id. at 672-73 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
97 Id. at 780 n.3 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
98 The Court also upheld application of the section 323(a) soft money ban to mi-
nor parties, in the absence of any evidence that the ban would prevent corruption or 
its appearance.  Id. at 669 (suggesting that a “nascent or struggling minor party” bring 
an as-applied challenge if the ban prevented amassing the resources necessary for ef-
fective advocacy).  An as-applied challenge would be very difficult to meet under Shrink 
Missouri’s standard for proving that a law prevents amassing resources necessary for 
effective advocacy. See supra text accompanying note 69 (examining the standard in 
Shrink Missouri).  Indeed, in rejecting the argument that section 323(b) prevented state 
and local parties from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy, the 
joint majority opinion confirmed that, in bringing an as-applied challenge, “[t]he 
question is not whether § 323(b) reduces the amount of funds available over previous 
election cycles, but whether it is ‘so radical in effect as to . . . drive the sound of [the 
recipient’s] voice below the level of notice.’”  McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 677 (quoting 
Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 397 (alterations in original)). 
99 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 684. 
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and local officeholders or candidates use only hard (federal) money 
to pay for any public communication that refers to a federal candidate 
and that promotes, supports, attacks, or opposes such a candidate 
(such as a local candidate who wishes to send a mailing in 2004 “urg-
ing voters to nominate Republicans like himself who support Presi-
dent Bush’s policies”).100  “We will not upset Congress’ eminently rea-
sonable prediction that . . . state and local candidates . . . will become 
the next conduits for the soft-money funding of sham issue advertis-
ing.”101  Similarly, the Court upheld a ban on national party officials’ 
soliciting of soft money for tax-exempt organizations engaged in po-
litical activity on the same basis:  “Absent the solicitation provision, 
national, state, and local party committees would have significant in-
centives to mobilize their formidable fundraising apparatuses, includ-
ing the peddling of access to federal officeholders, into the service of 
like-minded tax-exempt organizations that conduct activities benefit-
ing their candidates.”102
The theory that local political parties, local officials, or non-profit 
political organizations may become the next conduits for the sale of 
access certainly is “plausible,” and under Shrink Missouri plausibility is 
enough for constitutional regulation.103  The problem with a plausibil-
ity standard is the lack of a principled stopping point for legislative 
reach.  As the Chief Justice remarked: 
Newspaper editorials and political talk shows benefit federal candidates 
and officeholders every bit as much as a generic voter registration drive 
conducted by a state party; there is little doubt that the endorsement of a 
major newspaper affects federal elections, and federal candidates and of-
ficeholders are surely “grateful” for positive media coverage.  I doubt, 
however, the Court would seriously contend that we must defer to Con-
gress’ judgment if it chose to reduce the influence of political endorse-
ments in federal elections.
104
100 Lowenstein, supra note 15, at 281; see also McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 683-84 (“Sec-
tion 323(f) generally prohibits candidates for state or local office . . . from spending 
soft money to fund . . . a communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate 
for Federal office . . . and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or at-
tacks or oppose a candidate for that office.”). 
101 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 684. 
102 Id. at 678. 
103 See Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 378 (“The quantum of empirical evidence 
needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or 
down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.”) 
104 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 780 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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The joint majority opinion’s answer to the Chief Justice on this 
point was unsatisfying, expressing agreement without any explanation 
that Congress could not regulate “financial contributions” to political 
talk show hosts or newspaper editors “on the sole basis that their ac-
tivities conferred a benefit on the candidate,” and noting, without cit-
ing any further evidence, that “[t]he close relationship” between can-
didates and their parties “makes state and local parties effective 
conduits for donors desiring to corrupt federal candidates and office-
holders.”105
Given that most political talk show hosts or newspaper editors 
would not be accepting financial contributions, the majority’s re-
sponse was somewhat off-the-mark.  The Chief Justice’s point was not 
so much about contributions to such persons but rather to the possi-
bility that Congress could limit their election-related activities on 
grounds that the activities benefit candidates and affect federal elec-
tions. 
In any event, the Court’s analysis on the local party and candidate 
issue is clearly in line with post-2000 jurisprudence.  Lacking reason-
able evidence of actual corruption or the appearance of corruption, 
the Court, as in Colorado II, shifted to the mere possibility of circum-
vention and then used Shrink Missouri’s lowering of the evidentiary 
bar:  once the Court declared a claim of potential corruption “neither 
novel nor implausible,” it was poised to uphold the provision.106  The 
joint majority opinion’s analysis of the issue ended, consistently with 
Shrink Missouri, Colorado II, and Beaumont, with a call for deference to 
Congress.107
2.  Shallow Overbreadth Analysis on the Issue Advocacy Provisions 
Before the Supreme Court decided McConnell, many people be-
lieved that the question of whether the Court would uphold BCRA 
section 203’s extension of the separate fund requirement for corpora-
tions and labor unions depended upon the extent to which the law’s 
bright-line test for electioneering communications would capture 
105 Id. at 668 n.51; see also id. at 666 (“To be sure, mere political favoritism or op-
portunity for influence alone is insufficient to justify regulation.”). 
106 Id. at 661. 
107 See id. at 706 (“Many years ago we observed that to say that Congress is without 
power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard . . . an election from the improper 
use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation. . . the power of self pro-
tection.  We abide by that conviction [today]. . . . (citation, internal quotation marks, 
and brackets omitted)). 
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“genuine issue ads,” that is, advertisements not intended to influence 
the outcome of federal elections, such as advertisements run just be-
fore a presidential election by a corporation or union asking the 
president to get involved in a nasty labor dispute.108  Few advertise-
ments featuring express words of advocacy, such as “Vote for Smith,” 
would not be election-related.  On the other hand, it was unclear how 
many advertisements referring to a federal candidate in the sixty days 
before an election would be election-related.  To the extent that such 
advertisements were not election-related, the law might have been 
substantially overbroad—capturing too much speech that Congress 
would have insufficient reason to regulate—and therefore in violation 
of the First Amendment.109
The three lower court judges hearing McConnell devoted many 
pages and considerable effort to this question and focused particularly 
on two social science studies (the “Buying Time” studies110) examining 
the question.111  Judge Leon found that between 14.7% and 17% of 
the ads run before the 1998 and 2000 elections were genuine issue ad-
vertisements.112  Judge Kollar-Kotelly disagreed with both the 17% fig-
ure as well as its significance for the overbreadth analysis.113  Judge 
Henderson believed the figure was anywhere from 11.38% to 50.5% 
and, in any case, that the law was overbroad.114  The social science con-
108 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth:  Using Empirical Evidence to De-
termine the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws Targeting Sham Issue Advocacy, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 1773, 1797 (2001) (arguing that whether bright-line tests are constitu-
tionally overbroad depends on the frequency with which they capture speech not in-
tended to influence the outcome of an election). 
109 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (“[W]e believe that the 
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in rela-
tion to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”).  For my own look at the empirical evi-
dence of the potential for overbreadth with a BCRA-like bright line test, see Hasen, 
supra note 108, at 1797 (2001). 
 110  CRAIG B. HOLMAN & LUKE P. MCLOUGHLIN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, BUY-
ING TIME 2000:  TELEVISION ADVERTISEMENTS IN THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTIONS (2001); 
JONATHAN S. KRASNO & DANIEL E. SELTZ, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, BUYING TIME 
1998:  TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 1998 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (2000). 
111 McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 367-73 (D.D.C.) (Henderson, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 124 S. Ct. 619 
(2003); id. at 610-39, 719-52 (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring); id. at 792-99, 890-918 
(Leon, J., concurring). 
112 Id. at 795-99 (Leon, J., concurring). 
113 Id. at 636 (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring). 
114 Id. at 372 n.149 (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
  
54 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 31 
 
troversy spilled into the popular press after the lower court opinions 
issued.115
It was therefore surprising that the Supreme Court majority opin-
ion devoted only a single paragraph to this issue.  On the main point, 
the Court wrote: 
The precise percentage of issue ads that clearly identified a candidate 
and were aired during those relatively brief preelection time spans but 
had no electioneering purpose is a matter of dispute between the parties 
and among the judges on the District Court.  Nevertheless, the vast ma-
jority of ads clearly had such a purpose.
116
The joint majority opinion cited to those pages in Judge Leon’s 
opinion containing factual findings noting that “[m]any so-called ‘is-
sue ads’ by political parties were actually electioneering advertise-
ments that focused” either on the positions, past actions, or general 
character traits of federal candidates, or compared the position of two 
competing federal candidates, but not upon upcoming federal execu-
tive action or pending legislation.117  The Court neither cited to nor 
refuted Judge Leon’s conclusion that up to 17 percent of advertise-
ments could be considered “genuine issue advertisements,”118 nor did 
it explain how such a number could be consistent with the Court’s de-
termination that a “vast majority” of such ads had an electioneering 
purpose. 
After concluding that the vast majority of advertisements featuring 
candidates for federal office had an electioneering purpose, the Court 
added:  “Moreover, whatever the precise percentage may have been in 
the past, in the future corporations and unions may finance genuine 
issue ads during those time frames by simply avoiding any specific ref-
erence to federal candidates, or in doubtful cases by paying for the ad 
from a segregated fund.”119  The Court’s solution to overbreadth thus 
115 Compare George F. Will, 1,600 Pages of Confusion, WASH. POST, May 8, 2003, at 
A31 (discussing the “sham ‘social science’” that “powerfully influenced the congres-
sional vote on McCain-Feingold and is the foundation of two of the three judges’ opin-
ions that much of McCain-Feingold is constitutional”), with Thomas E. Mann, No Merit 
in Brennan Center Smear Campaign, ROLL CALL, May 22, 2003, at 
http://www.brook.edu/views/articles/mann/20030522.htm (asserting that the central 
conclusions of the Buying Time studies are valid regardless of the McCain-Feingold 
opponents’ critique of their methodology). 
116 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 696 (citations omitted). 
117 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 826 (Leon, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
118 See id. at 798 (Leon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing 
Professor Goldstein’s testimony). 
119 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 696. 
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created a potential new First Amendment problem by regulating the 
content that a corporation or labor union might use to communicate 
a political message. 
Compounding the issue of overbreadth was the Court’s treatment 
of “as applied” challenges, that is, challenges brought by individuals 
engaging in activity protected by the First Amendment but regulated 
under an allegedly overly broad law.  In a number of places in the 
joint majority opinion, the Court suggested that some First Amend-
ment challenges to BCRA might come in the form of as-applied chal-
lenges after the law was put into operation.120  However, it is not clear 
from the joint majority opinion whether a corporation or labor union 
(or an entity taking corporate or union funds) that wishes to spend 
unlimited funds on a “genuine issue advertisement” featuring a can-
didate for federal office could successfully mount such an as-applied 
challenge.  The Court did write that “we assume that the interests that 
justify the regulation of campaign speech might not apply to the regu-
lation of genuine issue ads.”121  But in the portion of the majority opin-
ion addressing Title V of BCRA, the majority characterized its holding 
on section 203 as “upholding stringent restrictions on all election-time 
advertising that refers to a candidate because such advertising will of-
ten convey message of support or opposition.”122  This language, with 
its original emphasis, suggests that corporations and labor unions may 
not be successful in making such as-applied challenges; the Court in-
stead appears willing to restrict all election-time advertising that refers 
to a candidate as such because it will often be constitutionally subject 
to regulation.123
The joint majority opinion’s cursory analysis of the overbreadth is-
sue is again consistent with the Court’s post-2000 jurisprudence.  The 
Court appeared to care little about the actual evidence, offering in-
stead a conclusory statement that the “vast majority” of the advertise-
120 See supra note 98 (noting that an “as-applied challenge would be very difficult 
to meet under Shrink Missouri’s standard”). 
121 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 696 n.88. 
122 Id. at 715 (Breyer, J.). 
123 In Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, No. 04-1260 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2004), avail-
able at http://www.fec.gov/pages/bcra/wrtl_opinion.pdf, a district court refused a re-
quest for a preliminary injunction by a group bringing such an as-applied challenge.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist then denied a request for such an injunction pending an ap-
peal.  Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, No. 04A194, 2004 WL 2086023 (Rehnquist, Cir-
cuit Justice, U.S. Sept. 14, 2004). 
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ments were sham issue ads,124 and deferring to a congressional deter-
mination that regulation was necessary. 
3.  Regulating Union Expenditures on Electioneering 
Communications 
The Michigan law at issue in the Austin case prohibited nonmedia 
corporations, but not labor unions, from making expenditures fund-
ing express advocacy.  The Austin Court held that the statute was not 
rendered constitutionally underinclusive by its failure to include labor 
unions: 
Whereas unincorporated unions, and indeed individuals, may be able to 
amass large treasuries, they do so without the significant state-conferred 
advantages of the corporate structure; corporations are “by far the most 
prominent example of entities that enjoy legal advantages enhancing 
their ability to accumulate wealth.” . . . 
 Moreover, labor unions differ from corporations in that union mem-
bers who disagree with a union’s political activities need not give up full 
membership in the organization to avoid supporting its political activi-
ties.  Although a union and an employer may require that all bargaining 
unit employees become union members, . . . . [a]n employee who ob-
jects to a union’s political activities . . . can decline to contribute to those 
activities, while continuing to enjoy the benefits derived from the un-
ion’s performance of its duties as the exclusive representative of the bar-
gaining unit on labor-management issues.  As a result, the funds avail-
able for a union’s political activities more accurately reflects members’ 
support for the organization’s political views than does a corporation’s 
general treasury.125
This reasoning not only provided a potentially good reason for a 
legislature to exclude unions from the corporate segregated fund re-
124 This problem of the majority ignoring the evidence runs throughout the opin-
ion.  Indeed, the majority never mentions the point that, because the lower McConnell 
Court was a three-judge panel, the Court apparently should have deferred only to the 
factual findings made by at least a majority of the lower court judges. See Wright v. 
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 71 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (“In light of these con-
flicting opinions and analyses, this case cannot be fairly decided on the ground stated 
in the opinion of the Court, viz., that ‘[w]e accept the District Court’s finding’ . . . [be-
cause] Judges Moore and Feinberg, who comprised the majority below, differed . . . 
with regard to the proof.” (first alteration in original)).  Instead, the joint majority 
opinion picks and chooses among the opinions of the lower court judges (primarily 
Judge Kollar-Kotelly, who would have upheld most of BCRA) for support without ever 
confronting the evidentiary problem. 
125 Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 665-66 (1990) (cita-
tions omitted). 
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quirement,126 but also a challenge to anyone who would seek to justify 
a segregated fund requirement for unions under the Austin rationale. 
In McConnell, the Court upheld the extension of the segregated 
fund requirement to unions’ electioneering communications, without 
ever considering whether the Austin rationale applied.  In a single 
paragraph, the joint majority opinion resolved the issue:  it simply 
cited to Austin, Beaumont, Colorado II, and NRWC on the special need 
to regulate corporations and the need to prevent circumvention of 
valid contribution limits, and left it at that.127
III.  MCCONNELL AS THE LATEST TRANSITIONAL CASE TOWARD THE 
PARTICIPATORY SELF-GOVERNMENT RATIONALE 
At least in hindsight,128 Shrink Missouri, Colorado II, and Beaumont 
may well be transitional cases toward the participatory self-government 
rationale.  Neither a substantial danger of corruption nor the appear-
ance of corruption appears to explain a legislative need to enact very 
low contribution limits, limits on party-coordinated expenditures of 
hard money on candidates, or a prohibition on campaign contribu-
tions to federal candidates by ideological nonprofit corporations.  
Which candidate for state or federal office would be bought (or even 
appear to be bought) by a $1075 donation, an individual’s limited 
hard money donation made to a political party, or a small contribu-
tion from an ideological corporation?  Rather, these laws—as read by 
the Court in the post-2000 cases—reflect a legislative desire to “de-
mocratize the influence that money can bring to bear upon the elec-
toral process, thereby building public confidence in that process, 
broadening the base of a candidate’s meaningful financial support, 
and encouraging greater public participation.”129
McConnell, too, appears to be a transitional case, with even 
stronger signals pointing to the participatory self-government ration-
ale.  The joint majority opinion no doubt takes pains to show its fidel-
ity to Buckley, tripping over itself to apply the corruption (as anticir-
126 Justice Scalia suggested a less charitable possibility:  the power of Michigan’s 
labor unions over the state legislature.  Id. at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
127 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 695-96.  The Court’s citation to NRWC in support of the 
barometer equality rationale is curious, given that NRWC did not endorse that ration-
ale. 
128 In 2000, I suggested that Shrink Missouri could play a transitional role away from 
Buckley.  See Hasen, supra note 58, at 505-07 (discussing how each of the Supreme Court 
Justices would be likely to read Shrink Missouri). 
129 Breyer, supra note 3, at 253. 
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cumvention) rationale to as many BCRA provisions as possible.  How-
ever, a more natural reading of the more controversial aspects of the 
joint majority opinion is as a sub silentio acceptance of the participatory 
self-government rationale. 
Certainly, the Court’s decision to reaffirm Austin and apply it to 
electioneering communications fits into the participatory self-
government rationale.  The Court can continue to dress up Austin’s 
barometer equality argument as one based on preventing “corrup-
tion,” but no one is fooled.  The only (arguably) legitimate reason 
that a corporation or union should be barred from spending money 
on election-related speech is because this would give its views dispro-
portionate weight in society, and the legislature is seeking to democra-
tize the influence that money can bring to bear upon the electoral 
process. 
The participatory self-government rationale similarly explains the 
joint majority opinion’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ argument that the 
segregated fund requirement for corporate spending on electioneer-
ing communications is constitutionally underinclusive because it ex-
empts media corporations’ spending on news items and commentary.  
The Court found the media exception “wholly consistent with First 
Amendment principles,”130 citing Austin’s rejection of a similar argu-
ment and a number of federal statutes providing advantages to the in-
stitutional press.  The Austin Court had praised what it viewed as the 
press’s “unique role . . . in ‘informing and educating the public, offer-
ing criticism, and providing a forum for discussion and debate.’”131
The joint majority opinion in McConnell goes further than Austin 
by stating that Congress may not regulate “financial contributions” to 
political talk show hosts or newspaper editors “on the sole basis that 
their activities confer a benefit on the candidate.”132  This statement 
suggests that an exception for the institutional press from a separate 
fund requirement might be not only constitutionally permissible, but 
constitutionally required, to further the objectives of participatory self-
government—the institutional corporate press is simply more worthy 
of protection than other corporations.133
130 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 697. 
131 Austin, 494 U.S. at 667 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 781 (1978)). 
132 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 668 n.51. 
133 If so, it would apparently mark the first time that the Court has recognized spe-
cial First Amendment protections for the institutional press.  See Cohen v. Cowles Me-
dia Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991) (stating that Minnesota’s enforcement of promis-
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The joint majority opinion contains many more signs of the 
Court’s acceptance of the participatory self-government rationale.  
The Court not only upheld BCRA against constitutional challenge; it 
lavished it and prior congressional regulatory efforts with effusive 
praise as furthering the needs of a well-functioning democracy.  Thus, 
“BCRA is the most recent federal enactment designed to purge na-
tional politics of what was conceived to be the pernicious influence of 
‘big money’ campaign contributions.”134  It followed earlier legislative 
developments including the enactment of FECA, through which Con-
gress “continued its steady improvement of the national election 
laws.”135
The joint majority opinion further opines that BCRA’s “fidelity” to 
the “imperatives” of “[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral proc-
ess, preventing corruption, and sustain[ing] the active, alert responsi-
bility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of 
the government,” “sets it apart from the statute in Bellotti—and, for 
that matter, from the Ohio statute banning the distribution of 
anonymous campaign literature struck down in McIntyre v. Ohio Elec-
tions Commission.”136  The joint majority opinion never tells us precisely 
how BCRA passes and the statutes at issue in Bellotti and McIntrye fail 
to meet these interests.  Indeed, the majority never defines the gov-
ernment’s interests in preserving the “integrity of the electoral proc-
ess” or sustaining an “active” and “alert” citizenry.  Are these interests 
subsidiary interests that are protected by the recognized anticorrup-
tion rationale, or are they new interests through which the Court may 
uphold additional campaign finance laws that further the goals of par-
ticipatory self-government? 
A final piece of evidence suggesting that McConnell is a transitional 
case is found in the Court’s description of Buckley’s holding striking 
sory estoppel against the media “is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be ap-
plied to enforcement against other persons or organizations”); Houchins v. KQED, 438 
U.S. 1, 14-16 (1978) (“[U]ntil the political branches decree otherwise, as they are free 
to do, the media have no special right of access to the Alameda County Jail different 
from or greater than that accorded the public generally.”); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 
U.S. 665, 692 (1972) (denying that “the First Amendment protects a newsman’s 
agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his source” in a grand jury proceeding); 
see also Hasen, Rupert Murdoch Problem, supra note 5, at 1657 (discussing the media’s po-
tential argument that they are “entitled to greater constitutional protection than the 
general public”). 
134 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 644 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
135 Id. at 645. 
136 See id. at 696 n.88 (alterations in original, citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted); see generally McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
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down expenditure limits.  The joint majority opinion in McConnell ac-
curately recounts the Buckley holding but pointedly fails to recount 
Buckley’s explicit rejection of the equality rationale as a justification for 
expenditure limits,137 that part of Buckley which Justice Breyer had said 
“cannot be taken literally.”138  It seems as probable as not that the 
Court’s elisional history was intentional and not inadvertent. 
IV.  A NOTE OF CAUTION:  APPLYING THE PARTICIPATORY SELF-
GOVERNMENT RATIONALE IN A RESPONSIBLE MANNER 
A.  Missing from McConnell:  Careful Balancing  
and Policing for Self-Interest 
Justice Breyer, in his Shrink Missouri concurrence, admonished 
that “constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal 
equation.”139  He directed his admonition to those Justices such as Jus-
tice Thomas who saw the First Amendment rights of free speech and 
association as trumping most, if not all, campaign finance regula-
tion.140  But the admonition should apply as well to those Justices vot-
ing to uphold campaign finance regulation in the post-2000 cases and 
especially in McConnell, because in their embrace of legislative defer-
ence, they have abdicated their responsibility to carefully balance 
competing constitutional concerns and to police legislatively enacted 
campaign finance regulations for self-interest. 
Justice Kennedy’s partial dissent in McConnell sounded incumbency 
protection as a major theme.  “When one recognizes that §§ 323(a), 
(b), (d), and (f) do not serve the interest the anticorruption rationale 
contemplates, Title I’s entirety begins to look very much like an in-
cumbency protection plan.”141  Justice Scalia similarly focused on in-
137 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 647.  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the majority 
on the Title III and Title IV issues does mention the Court’s rejection of the equality 
rationale in response to the argument of the Adams plaintiffs that an increase in the 
hard money contribution limits constituted a denial of equal protection.  Id. at 708-09 
(Rehnquist, C.J.). 
138 Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
139 Id. at 400. 
140 For Justice Thomas, we now know that it is closer to all than most.  Justice 
Thomas alone rejected even the disclosure requirements of BCRA. See McConnell, 124 
S. Ct. at 735-36 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The right to 
anonymous speech cannot be abridged based on the interests asserted by the defen-
dants.”). 
141 Id. at 753 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice 
Kennedy pointed in particular to the fact that “Congress exempted its officeholders 
from the more stringent prohibitions [on solicitations] imposed on party officials.”  Id.  
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cumbency in his separate opinion,142 citing to numerous Congres-
sional floor statements that BCRA’s purpose in expanding the corpo-
rate and union separate fund requirement to electioneering commu-
nications was to limit the extent of negative “attack ads.”143
The joint majority opinion’s response to the incumbency argu-
ment—tucked into a footnote apparently added to the opinion at the 
end of the drafting process144—is both unsatisfying and disingenuous: 
Any concern that Congress might opportunistically pass campaign-
finance regulation for self-serving ends is taken into account by the ap-
plicable level of scrutiny.  Congress must show concrete evidence that a 
particular type of financial transaction is corrupting or gives rise to the 
appearance of corruption and that the chosen means of regulation are 
closely drawn to address that real or apparent corruption.
145
The response is unsatisfying because it incorrectly assumes that 
identifying the appropriate level of scrutiny can substitute for a careful 
balancing and the difficult judgment calls that the Court faces in 
evaluating campaign finance regulation.146  The response is disin-
The majority’s response to this particular point was to say that the provisions “allow[] 
only minimally greater opportunities for solicitation out of regard for the fact that can-
didates and officeholders, unlike party officers, can never step out of their official 
roles.”  Id. at 684 n.72 (joint majority opinion); see also id. at 680 (“[N]ational party 
officers, unlike federal candidates and officeholders, are able to solicit soft money on 
behalf of nonprofit organizations in their individual capacities.”).  But the Court never 
explains how it is that a member of Congress is less able to step out of her official role 
for purposes of soliciting a contribution to a tax-exempt organization than the Chair of 
the Democratic National Committee. 
142 See, e.g., id. at 720-21 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (as-
serting that, though “the legislation is evenhanded,” it nevertheless benefits incum-
bents because, when “incumbents and challengers are limited to the same quantity of 
electioneering, incumbents are favored”). 
143 Id. at 727. 
144 I suggest that footnote 72 appeared late because it both misspelled “overruled” 
as “overrruled” and miscited 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e) as 42 U.S.C. § 441i(e).  Id. at 684 n.72. 
145 Id. at 684 n.72.  The joint majority opinion added:  “At bottom, Justice Kennedy 
has long disagreed with the basic holding of Buckley and its progeny that less rigorous 
scrutiny—which shows a measure of deference to Congress in an area where it enjoys 
particular expertise—applies to assess limits on campaign contributions.”  Id. 
146 Cf. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Nor can 
we expect that mechanical application of the tests associated with ‘strict scrutiny’—the 
tests of ‘compelling interests’ and ‘least restrictive means’—will properly resolve the 
difficult constitutional problem that campaign finance statutes pose.”).  Justice Breyer 
suggested in his Shrink Missouri concurrence that a lax standard of review may provide 
enough protection in campaign finance cases challenging contribution limits, because 
deference there “does not risk such constitutional evils as, say, permitting incumbents 
to insulate themselves from effective electoral challenge.”  Id. at 402.  But his reasoning 
is unclear:  certainly a very low contribution limit may benefit incumbents because of 
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genuous because, as Part II illustrates, under the post-2000 campaign 
finance jurisprudence, the Court (1) no longer requires “concrete 
evidence” of corruption to sustain a campaign finance limit; (2) has 
elastically redefined “corruption” so as to include even the eventual 
threat of circumvention of existing law or potential benefit to an of-
ficeholder, without requiring any evidence to that effect; (3) has ex-
plained that “closely drawn” campaign finance statutes in fact need 
not be “fine tuned;” and (4) has left open the “appearance of corrup-
tion” as a catchall for upholding any campaign finance regulation that 
fails to meet the test for actual corruption whenever the government 
can point to potential benefits to officeholders. 
The Court should have taken the incumbency question seriously, 
and more openly and directly addressed the kinds of balancing that 
appeared to be going on behind the scenes in resolving the BCRA 
challenges in any case.  Instead of doing so, the joint majority opinion 
repeatedly calls for legislative deference.  It is easy to praise the 
Court’s deference in McConnell as a corrective to the Supreme Court’s 
federalism excesses of the last decade.147  But blanket calls for defer-
ence are misplaced if one takes the goals of participatory self-
government seriously. 
In engaging in careful balancing and policing for self-dealing un-
der the participatory self-government rationale, there is a place for 
deference and a place for skepticism.  In particular, the Court should 
defer, within reason,148 to the value judgments made by legislative bod-
their tendency to be able to raise money more easily, as some have argued was the case 
with the Missouri limits.  See, e.g., Schotland, supra note 15, at 342 (“In short, all Mis-
souri enacted was a low limit on contributions directly to candidates, easily avoided.  
Strikingly, Missouri has the 10th highest incumbent reelection rate for its legislators, 
1980-2001.  So much for protecting “the integrity of the electoral process.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
147 See Linda Greenhouse, A Court Infused with Pragmatism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 
2003, at A38 (“[I]t is possible to view [McConnell] as something of a corrective, a prag-
matic intervention . . . to lower the temperature of an increasingly fraught relationship 
with another branch of government.  ‘The court gave Congress space to breathe.’” 
(quoting Yale Law School Professor Robert C. Post)); Cass R. Sunstein, Editorial, In 
Court v. Congress, Justices Concede One, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2003, at B3 (noting that, 
prior to McConnell, the Rehnquist Court’s “invalidations [of federal legislation] 
seemed to herald a return to long-discarded ideas about states’ rights”). 
148 On this important qualifier, see infra Part IV.C (noting that the Court should 
remain cognizant of the fact that expenditure limits level down the amount of speech 
to achieve democratic goals). 
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ies on contested issues of political equality,149 but should not defer on 
a close fit of means and ends.150  Leaving such value judgments to the 
political process better serves the goals of the democratic system by as-
suring both experimentation and flexibility so as to strengthen de-
mocratic institutions. 
Judicial deference to legislative value judgments in this area would 
not be an abdication of the Court’s role to protect those speech and 
association rights protected by the First Amendment.  The Court 
would retain a crucial role in assuring that the means the legislature 
has put forward to promote equality concerns, such as participatory 
self-government, are in fact likely to achieve those ends.  The purpose 
of this close scrutiny is to serve as a substitute for a test of legislative 
motive.  Legislators may be tempted to regulate in the name of political 
equality but really to protect themselves from competition or to fur-
ther their own agendas.  But proof of such motive is often absent, sug-
gesting the means-ends testing as a second best solution.  When the 
means and ends do not match well, the reason may be that the ends 
asserted are not the ends intended.151
B.  Reconsidering the Three Examples Under a More Responsible Balancing 
Approach 
To give a better sense of how the careful balancing approach dif-
fers from both Buckley and the deferential approach of the post-2000 
cases, I return to the three examples from the McConnell decision first 
described in Part II:  BCRA § 323(b)’s soft money ban applied to local 
political parties; concerning corporations and labor unions, the po-
tential overbreadth problems stemming from BCRA § 203’s segre-
149 Cf. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 403 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he legislature 
understands the problem—the threat to electoral integrity, the need for democratiza-
tion—better than do we.”) 
150 I first advanced this idea in HASEN, SUPREME COURT & ELECTION LAW, supra 
note 13, at 116-20. 
151 Of course, in the face of actual evidence of improper legislative motive, the 
Court should certainly disapprove campaign finance regulation enacted in the name 
of political equality.  For example, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765 (1978), there was strong evidence that the Massachusetts legislature acted specifi-
cally to ban corporate expenditures in ballot measure elections because corporations 
had been successful in the past in blocking an income tax initiative favored by a major-
ity of legislators (but that required voter approval for enactment). See id. at 826-27 n.6 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“If inquiry into legislative motives were to determine the 
outcome of cases such as this, I think a very persuasive argument could be made that 
the General Court . . . simply decided to muzzle corporations on this sort of issue so 
that it could succeed in its desire.”). 
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gated fund requirement and the apparent lack of an as-applied chal-
lenge to the provision; and the Court’s failure to consider application 
of the Austin rationale to labor unions. 
Recall that the joint majority opinion explained the decision to 
uphold the soft money ban’s application to local political parties as 
based not upon any evidence, but upon conjecture that local parties 
could eventually become conduits for the sale of access to federal of-
ficeholders.152  In its analysis on this point, the Court correctly de-
ferred to Congress, finding that it was a permissible goal to prevent 
such sales of access, even if it could not be proven that access in fact 
led to a change in voting behavior by members of Congress:153  it is a 
reasonable, though contested, political equality determination that 
access to federal officeholders should not go to the highest bidder.154
But it is a much closer question whether Congress should be al-
lowed, consistent with the First Amendment, to place a host of signifi-
cant federal fundraising limitations on local parties’ get-out-the-vote 
and voter registration activities and local candidates’ electioneering 
activities solely upon the as-of-yet unsubstantiated fear that local par-
ties could become the next conduits for federal corruption.  There 
may be good reason to believe that sale of access through local parties 
might be less effective than sale through state parties given potential 
problems of coordination and decentralization, making local parties 
less valuable to federal officeholders than other means of support.  
Absent at least some evidence that local political parties posed a dan-
ger of undermining participatory self-government unless regulated by 
Congress, the Court likely should have rejected this aspect of section 
323(b), or at least deferred consideration of the question until evi-
152 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. 
153 Compare McConnell, 124 S. Ct. 619, 750 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part) (“[N]o 
Member of Congress testified this favoritism [gained from soft money contributions] 
changed voting behavior.”), with id. at 664 (joint majority opinion) (“The evidence 
connects soft money to manipulations of the legislative calendar, leading to Congress’ 
failure to enact, among other things, generic drug legislation, tort reform, and tobacco 
legislation.” (citations omitted)).  Once again, the majority appears to have based a 
factual finding solely on the evidence of a single judge, Judge Kollar-Kotelly.  The ma-
jority cited to page 852 of Judge Leon’s opinion as support for the evidence, but there 
Judge Leon wrote:  “Testimony from other former Members of Congress describe, at 
best, their personal conjecture regarding the impact of soft money donations on the 
voting practices of their present and former colleagues.”  McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 
852 (Leon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
154 I defend this point in Hasen, Clipping Coupons, supra note 5, and Hasen, Rupert 
Murdoch Problem, supra note 5. 
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dence could be gathered that local political parties could indeed play 
this role.155
The overbreadth question was similarly more complex than the 
joint majority opinion admitted.  Absent from the overbreadth analy-
sis was some sort of qualitative determination that the extent of the 
overbreadth was worth sustaining for the sake of a workable campaign 
finance system.  Thus, the majority never considered whether the pro-
vision, under Justice Breyer’s standard, “strike[s] a reasonable balance 
between [its] electoral speech-restricting and speech-enhancing con-
sequences.”156  It simply concluded that a “vast majority” of the adver-
tisements were election-related and therefore subject to regulation.157
Yet when it comes to overbreadth analysis, “[t]here is no sensible 
substitute, at least in hard cases, for a forthright judicial balancing.”158  
The Court must inquire “whether the state’s interest is truly compel-
ling, and, if so, whether that interest justifies as much infringement 
on, and chilling of, protected speech as the statute effects.”159
Thus, the answer to the overbreadth question for regulating 
sham issue advocacy depends not only on the percentage of genuine 
issue advertisements captured but also on the benefits that the legisla-
tion hopes to achieve compared to the costs of requiring corporations 
and unions wishing to run genuine issue ads to do so only through a 
separate PAC.160  Such a balancing of interests no doubt occurred be-
neath the surface in McConnell, even if the Justices failed to say so ex-
plicitly:  eight of the nine Justices on the Court were willing to sustain 
BCRA’s basic disclosure rules despite the fact that it applied disclosure 
rules to the exact same percentage of genuine issue advertisements and 
despite the fact that disclosure rules no doubt burden First Amend-
ment rights of speech and association.161  Yet the Court split 5-4 on ex-
155 The Court appeared to defer consideration of other aspects of BCRA pending 
rulemaking by the Federal Communications Commission.  McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 718 
(Breyer, J.). 
156 Breyer, supra note 3, at 253. 
157 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 696. 
158 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 894 (1991) 
(footnote omitted). 
159 Id. at 895. 
160 See Hasen, supra note 108, at 1801 (“[I]n evaluating each case, there seems no 
substitute for looking at the benefits that the legislation hopes to achieve in regulating 
sham issue advocacy on the one hand with the costs of overbreadth on the other.”). 
161 All of the Justices except for Justice Thomas joined in Justice Rehnquist’s opin-
ion with respect to BCRA Title III, other than sections 304, 305 and 307.  See McConnell, 
124 S. Ct. at 640 (summarizing the votes of the Justices). 
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tending the corporate and union segregated fund requirement to 
electioneering communications. 
For reasons I have explored elsewhere162 and will not repeat here, 
I believe that Congress had a good reason to extend Austin’s rationale 
to electioneering communications, despite the overbreadth problem.  
But the issue is a difficult one.  On the one hand, effective campaign 
finance regulation had become all but impossible under Buckley’s ex-
press advocacy (or “magic words”) test.  On the other hand, there is 
something troubling about limiting the ability of corporations and la-
bor unions to engage in political speech unrelated to elections at the 
time when the corporation or union may be most likely to command 
an officeholder’s attention.  The McConnell Court’s decision, though 
controversial, is certainly defensible under a participatory self-
government rationale. 
What is indefensible, however, is the McConnell Court’s dismissive 
approach to the question.  Even more indefensible is the Court’s fail-
ure to explicitly leave open (and perhaps affirmatively to exclude) the 
possibility of an as-applied challenge for a corporation or labor union 
that wishes to engage in genuine issue advocacy using corporate or 
union funds.163
Finally, on the issue of including unions under the Austin ration-
ale, it is hardly clear that unions pose the same dangers as corpora-
tions under the participatory self-government rationale.164  Perhaps 
the Court could have constructed a rationale based on the idea that 
parity between unions and corporations is somehow necessary for par-
ticipatory self-government in the United States.165  But the Court of-
162 See Hasen, supra note 108, at 1803 (“[T]he corrosive effects of corporate wealth 
on the political process do not differ when the corporation sponsors a ‘Defeat Bonior’ 
advertisement rather than a sham issue advocacy advertisement criticizing Bonior’s 
drug policy.”). 
163 See supra note 120 and accompanying text (noting that the joint majority opin-
ion in McConnell suggests that there might be some “as applied” challenges to BCRA); 
cf. Hasen, supra note 108, at 1802 n.114 (endorsing possibility of an as-applied chal-
lenge in appropriate circumstances). 
164 See supra note 125 and accompanying text (quoting Austin’s reasons for the 
permissibility of not including unions in the corporate segregated fund requirement 
for election-related speech). 
165 As Dan Lowenstein observed before McConnell:  “[T]he tradition over the past 
half century of treating unions and corporations alike under federal and many state 
election laws might lead the Court to uphold a ban on independent expenditures by 
unions even if the logic of the decided cases suggests otherwise.”  Lowenstein, supra 
note 54, at 386 n.21.  The unions themselves did not push the distinction between cor-
porations and unions, see, e.g., Reply Brief of AFL-CIO Appellants/Cross-Appellees, 
McConnell v. FEC (No. 02-1755), available at 2003 WL 22002434, perhaps out of fear 
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fered no such rationale; indeed, it skipped over the question entirely 
as though it were self-evident. 
C.  The Future Constitutionality of Expenditure Limitations in the  
Post-McConnell Supreme Court 
1.  Why the Court Might Be Poised to Uphold Some Expenditure 
Limits 
Perhaps the ultimate question about the direction of the post-
2000 jurisprudence is whether it may lead the Supreme Court to up-
hold expenditure limits outside the corporate and union context.  After 
Shrink Missouri was decided, but before Colorado II, Beaumont, the pas-
sage of BCRA, or McConnell, I suggested that the Court’s new deferen-
tial jurisprudence could indeed provide for such a possibility.166  After 
recounting the spending of the Wyly brothers on anti-McCain sham 
issue advertisements during the New York Republican presidential 
primary,167 I wrote: 
Suppose Congress, citing the Wyly advertisements, passed a law regulat-
ing such advertisements.  Congress could redefine “express advocacy” or 
electioneering to include [the bright-line test that had been proposed in 
the McCain-Feingold bill and later adopted in BCRA].  It could then 
subject independent expenditures to dollar limitations, as the FECA did 
before that portion of it was struck down.  A Supreme Court hospitable 
to such a new law could say that Buckley’s decisions regarding expendi-
tures and issue advocacy were made under the pressure of the 1976 elec-
tion, before there had been an opportunity to gather evidence on the 
corruption and the appearance of corruption stemming from independ-
ent expenditures and before those engaged in electioneering routinely 
evaded the FECA . . . . The Court could then say that evidence now 
demonstrates that such expenditures are meant to influence the out-
come of electoral campaigns.  Further, even absent evidence of coordi-
nation, voters may believe that Wyly will “call the tune” for Bush; no 
that Congress would respond to a decision striking down the application of section 203 
to labor unions by repealing its application to corporations. 
166 See Hasen, supra note 58, at 500-09 (analyzing the Supreme Court justices’ likely 
interpretations of Shrink Missouri and predicting the demise of Buckley). 
167 Id. at 503.  The Wyly brothers are longtime Bush supporters from Texas.  See 
Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Richard Pérez-Peña, Role in Ads Puts Focus on Bush Friend, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2000, at A16 (noting that the Wyly brothers were among George W. 
Bush’s most generous campaign contributors during the primary).  The McConnell 
opinion mentions the activities of the Wyly brothers as well.  See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 
691 (“Curiously, Plaintiffs want to preserve the ability to run these [sham issue] adver-
tisements while hiding behind dubious and misleading names like . . . ‘Republicans for 
Clean Air’ (funded by brothers Charles and Sam Wyly).”) (citation omitted).
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proof of a quid pro quo is required under Shrink Missouri, only the possi-
bility that Bush might be “too compliant” with the interests of his bene-
factor. 
The Court might not require much evidence from Congress if it believed 
these claims were “neither novel nor implausible.”  Perhaps it would be 
enough to point to a New York Times profile of Wyly in which the Texas 
director of consumer group Public Citizen recounted how Wyly, who has 
an interest in a company investing in renewable energy, had offered to 
help convince Governor Bush to include a provision in an energy bill re-
quiring that certain coal plants reduce their pollution.  The director said 
“the episode ‘is a crystalline example of what donors get from Bush for 
their contributions—an opportunity to make their pitch.’”
168
Four years later, with McConnell making up the fourth in the New 
Deference Quartet, this scenario seems increasingly more likely.  In-
deed, the kind of evidence I cited in my 2000 article reads very much 
like the kind of evidence cited by the McConnell joint majority opinion 
to support the soft money bans.  To be sure, such a change in cam-
paign finance jurisprudence is not going to happen until five Justices 
are comfortable overruling the central aspect of Buckley, which struck 
down expenditure limitations.169  But the reasoning of the post-2000 
cases applies, without much of a stretch, to the Court upholding ex-
penditure limitations. 
If the relevant anticorruption question from McConnell is whether 
there are sufficient potential benefits to federal officeholders,170 then surely 
some limits on independent expenditures could be warranted.  It is 
no more “novel” or “implausible” that large independent spending 
supporting a federal officeholder can benefit that officeholder and 
secure access to her than that soft money raised by local political par-
ties,171 or spent by local officials on certain public communications,172 
can benefit the federal officeholder and secure access to her. 
To be sure, the McConnell Court tries to rein in the potential bene-
fit idea by pointing to the “close relationship” federal officeholders 
168 Hasen, supra note 58, at 503-04 (citations omitted). 
169 Cf. id. at 504 (“The Court would not even need to expressly overrule Buckley . . . 
instead, it could distinguish Buckley on grounds that new evidence is available that was 
not available in Buckley that would justify a law even under Buckley’s strict scrutiny-like 
standard for expenditures.”). 
170 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
171 BCRA, sec. 101, § 323(b). 
172 BCRA, sec. 101, § 323(f). 
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and candidates have with their parties.173  Corruptive potential must ac-
company the potential to benefit officeholders.  But the Wyly brothers 
had their own close relationship with Bush, and the McConnell Court 
itself detailed the connections between federal officeholders and a 
number of nonprofit political organizations that might engage in in-
dependent spending benefiting these officeholders.  It might be that 
such organizations would fall on the same side of the line as the par-
ties, with “political talk show hosts” and “newspaper editors” on the 
other side of the line.174  The organizations might not be, like parties, 
“uniquely positioned to serve as conduits for corruption;”175 but 
rather, as organizations that have eliminated the middleman, they are 
uniquely positioned to gain access to the federal officeholder by at-
tracting attention through their independent spending. 
There is even a suggestion in McConnell that the Court might up-
hold expenditure limits in the absence of a potential benefit to office-
holders.  This point would be especially important if state or local 
governments attempted—contra Bellotti and CARC—to limit spending 
in ballot measure campaigns, where the possibility of corrupting an 
officeholder is attenuated, if not absent.176
Much turns here on interpretation of McConnell’s cryptic, but cru-
cially important, footnote 48 of the joint majority opinion,177 where 
the Court explained (or rather reinterpreted) its earlier decision in 
CMA.178  CMA involved a challenge to FECA’s $5000 limit on contribu-
173 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 668 n.51.  The joint majority opinion also never explic-
itly endorses the argument put forward by the defenders of section 203 that Congres-
sional power extends to any advertisement that may affect federal elections, whether or 
not the advertiser so intends. Cf. id. at 770 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part). 
174 See id. at 668 n.51 (“We agree with The Chief Justice that Congress could not 
regulate financial contributions to political talk show hosts or newspaper editors on 
the sole basis that their activities conferred a benefit on the candidate.”). 
175 Id. 
176 It is attenuated because officeholders sometimes link their fortunes to initia-
tives. Richard L. Hasen, Parties Take the Initiative (and Vice Versa), 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
731, 744 n.58 (2000) (describing several California candidates’ use of the initiative 
process); Elizabeth Garrett, Democracy in the Wake of the California Recall, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 239, 241 & n.9 (2004) (making a similar point in the context of the California re-
call election). 
177 124 S. Ct. at 665 n.48.  I thank Marty Lederman for first causing me to consider 
the importance of footnote 48. 
178 453 U.S. 182 (1981).  A four-Justice plurality opinion as well as Justice Black-
mun’s separate concurring opinion appeared to focus solely on the pass-through prob-
lem.  Id. at 198 (plurality opinion) (“If appellants’ position . . . is accepted, then both 
these contribution limitations could be easily evaded.”); id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring) (“I conclude that contributions to multicandidate political committees may 
be limited to $5,000 per year as a means of preventing evasion of the limitations [those 
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tions to PACs.  The McConnell Court stated that the statute at issue in 
CMA was justified not only to prevent “pass-throughs” of contributions 
to federal candidates but also as an appropriate measure to limit con-
tributions funding “express advocacy and numerous other noncoor-
dinated expenditures.”179  The footnote’s statement that it could be 
consistent with the First Amendment to limit contributions funding 
independent expenditures suggests that it is perhaps also consistent 
with the First Amendment to limit independent expenditures them-
selves.180
The extent of footnote 48’s reach is unclear.  On what basis might 
contributions to fund independent expenditures be limited?  Perhaps 
the Court’s point in the footnote is simply a variation of the potential 
benefits theme:  contributions funding independent expenditures 
may benefit officeholders and secure access to them.  If that is correct, 
however, independent expenditures themselves in candidate elections 
may serve the same purpose, and the entire Buckley edifice, built on a 
foundation of a contribution-expenditure dichotomy, falls. 
On the other hand, perhaps the Court had some other idea in 
mind as to why such a law would survive First Amendment challenge.  
For example, perhaps such laws might be justified on political equality 
grounds.  If it turns out that the reasoning is not tied to potential 
benefits of officeholders or the potential to corrupt them, then appli-
cation of expenditure limits even in ballot measure campaigns seems 
constitutionally possible.  Again, the Buckley edifice falls.  Is that what 
the Court really intended buried in a few sentences of a footnote in 
one of the longest cases in Supreme Court history? 
under 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(A) & 441(a)(a)(3)], on contributions to a candidate or 
his authorized campaign committee . . . .”).  Justice Blackmun then went on to 
“stress . . . that a different result would follow if [the statute] were applied to contribu-
tions to a political committee established for the purpose of making independent ex-
penditures, rather than contributions to candidates.”  Id; see also Lincoln Club v. City of 
Irvine, 292 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2002) (raising but not resolving the constitutionality 
of limiting contributions to independent expenditure committees). 
 The McConnell Court pointed also at Buckley’s decision to uphold a $25,000 aggre-
gate yearly limit on individual contributions to candidates’ political committees and 
party committees.  McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 665 n.48 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38). 
179 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 665 n.48. 
180 The question is at the heart of regulating 527 committees that have been active 
in the 2004 presidential election.  See Richard L. Hasen, Commentary, A GOP Flip-Flop 
on Political Ads, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, at M5 (“The really interesting question is 
whether these ads should be illegal.  The question goes to the heart of why we regulate 
campaign money in the first place.”). 
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2.  Examining the Constitutionality of Expenditure Limits Under the 
Participatory Self-Government Rationale 
Although it is now easy to imagine how the McConnell majority 
could write an opinion upholding an expenditure limit under an anti-
circumvention/anticorruption/potential benefit theory, one hopes 
the Court would not do so without engaging in careful balancing and 
policing for legislative self-interest.  Expenditure limits may tend to 
benefit incumbents by giving them a chance to limit funds spent op-
posing them.  Even putting aside self-interest, expenditure limits raise 
troubling questions under the participatory self-government rationale 
to the extent they inhibit vibrant election-related participation by a 
wide group of nongovernmental actors.  The McConnell Court may 
have oversold the value of the institutional press in fostering this de-
bate and undersold the value of corporate and other speech in Beau-
mont.181
These points raise difficult questions involving theory (what is the 
best form of representative government?), facts (to what extent do 
expenditure limits inhibit robust political speech?), and division of la-
bor (to what extent should the courts defer to legislatures, which have 
greater expertise in political affairs but also a serious agency prob-
lem?). 
At bottom, the problem with expenditure limits is that they 
achieve political equality by leveling down the amount of speech.182  
Leveling down political speech seems antithetical to the participatory 
self-government rationale.  Expenditure limits only make sense from 
the point of view of participatory self-government when they are cou-
pled with level-up mechanisms that increase the vibrancy and diversity 
of election-related speech.  Full public financing of campaigns, espe-
cially through a market-mimicking voucher program, could well 
accomplish these goals.183  Without such a level-up mechanism, the 
Court should be wary of deferring to the genuinely-made value judg-
ment of a legislative body that would impose expenditure limits in the 
name of furthering democratic values. 
181 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (analyzing the holding and impli-
cations of Beaumont). 
182 See Joel L. Fleishman & Pope McCorkle, Level-Up Rather than Level-Down:  To-
wards a New Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 1 J.L. & POL. 211, 247 (1984)(criticizing 
the “inegalitarian policy outcomes” of a leveling-down approach). 
183 See Hasen, Clipping Coupons, supra note 5, at 21 (defending voucher proposal 
that both levels-up and levels-down). 
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CONCLUSION 
Reformers have much to cheer in the McConnell decision.  It is es-
sentially a green light to enact any kind of rational campaign finance 
plan in candidate elections—at least any rational plan that does not 
include expenditure limits applied outside the corporate/union con-
text or limits applied to media corporations.  But after the cheering 
subsides, the reform community needs to take a hard look at what 
McConnell and the other post-2000 jurisprudence have wrought.  Few 
reformers will be cheered in the long run by campaign finance laws 
that are indeed intended to limit competition or that balance interests 
(expressly or not) in ways that squelch rigorous debate about political 
(including electoral) issues. 
In the short term, the job of balancing and policing will fall to leg-
islatures and to the public interest organizations that monitor them.  
Lower courts showing fidelity to McConnell will have a difficult time 
striking down most campaign finance regulation, and the possibility of 
abuse, especially on the state and local level, seems apparent. 
In the long term, the Court will have to consider whether the con-
siderable deference advanced in McConnell does an adequate job of 
protecting constitutional interests on both sides of the legal equation.  
After pushing the point for many years that the First Amendment is 
not everything, the reform community must admit that it is some-
thing:  a value that must be taken into account, not only in balance 
with anticorruption measures, but also in assuring true participatory 
self-government. 
